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REcENT CASES

it did arrive at a correct and just conclusion. Perhaps in future cases
this point can be clarified and reduced to the basic principles of landowners' liability to trespassing children, without being tied to the
use of the antiquated term, "attractive nuisance", and to so-called
"extensions" of this doctrine. The court very capably dealt with the
fence law statute in deciding it did not govern in a situation where it
was not strictly applicable and other circumstances dictated the necessity for a fence. Although the dissenting opinion finds the majority
opinion to be ".... divergent from my idea of the law . . ." it is the
rule supported by numerous jurisdictions and one which is being increasingly followed. The necessity for this rule of landowners'
liability to trespassing children, without the attractiveness limitations,
is very aptly stated by Prosser, when, speaking of trespassing children
he states:
If he is to be protected the person who may do it with the least in-

convenience is the one upon whose land he strays, and the interest in
unrestricted freedom to make use of the land may be required, within
reasonable limits, to give way to the greater social interest in the
safety of the child.16
Fred F. Bradley
ToRTs-TimspAss-KENTocKy ElnMINATES A STCr LAmxrry RULEThe plaintiff, a child, lived in a house near the highway. While returning to her home from across the road, she was struck by a rock thrown
from the wheels of a passing truck. According to her testimony, after
she had entered her yard the truck passed and, as she stated, "It
throwed a rock out and hit me and broke my leg." It was not shown
conclusively at the trial whether the rock had come from between the
dual wheels of the truck or was lying in the highway when it was
thrown onto plaintiffs land. The evidence presented was not sufficient
to show that the operator of the truck was negligent. Held: judgment
for the plaintiff in the trial court reversed. Defendant is not liable for
a personal injury inflicted upon another by an unintentional, nonnegligent act, although the injury was preceeded by an unprivileged
intrusion upon land occupied by the injured party. Randall v. Shelton,
293 S.W. 2d 559 (Ky. 1956).
In its earlier stages trespass was identified with the view that any
forcible or direct invasion of the person or property of another was an
actionable trespass, even if the injury was a pure accident.1 The em16 Prosser, Torts, Sec. 76 at 438 (2nd ed. 1955).
1 Restatement, Torts, Sec. 166 (1934).
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phasis was upon the causal sequence involved in the injury, and the
question of whether the injury was the result of unintentional and
non-negligent conduct was of no importance. 2 Later, trespass on the
case was designed to afford a remedy in those cases in which one of
the elements of trespass was missing. This action on the case came to
be used more frequently in actions involving negligence, while trespass
became the remedy most often used for intentional wrongs. 3 This
change was accompanied by a growing recognition that, under either
action, there should be no liability for injuries arising out of pure
accident.4 With few exceptions, 5 it is now very generally required that
the injury must result from either intentional or negligent conduct before liability will be imposed.6
The Kentucky court has required that either negligence or intent
exist in cases of actionable trespass to the person since at least as early
as 1892. 7 However, just at the time when other jurisdictions were discarding the strict liability rule, Kentucky courts embraced its and began imposing liability for unintentional, non-negligent entries upon
land with accompanying personal injury. The leading decision in a
series granting relief in such cases is Louisville Railway Co. v.
Sweeney.9 In that case a street car left its tracks and struck a utility
pole. The pole fell against a gate fronting the property of the plaintiff,
causing it to swing back violently and injure the plaintiff who was
standing on her own property. The entry was not shown to have been
occasioned by any negligent act or omission by the defendant. The
court placed considerable emphasis upon the directness of the causal
sequence, resorting to the analogy of the lighted squib case. In rendering a verdict for the plaintiff, the court said,
The plaintiff as the owner of her property was entitled to the undisputed possession of it. The entry of the defendant upon it...
was
a trespass.' 0

It is obvious that under such a rule the present case would have
resulted in a recovery by the plaintiff since the only thing necessary
2 For a conflicting view see Holmes, The Common Law 4 (1881).
8 Prosser, Torts 27 (2nd ed. 1955).
4 Id. at 28.

For a thorough treatment of these exceptions such as blasting, collecting
and storing water, liability of owners of animals, etc., see Smith, Tort and Absolute
Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 319 at 329-334
(1916).
6 Restatement, Torts, See. 166 (1934).
7 Belt Electric Line Co. v. Creason, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 203 (1892).
s Oddly enough, a diligent search of Kentucky law revealed no case prior to
1914 wbich imposed strict liability in cases of trespass to land, since all the cases
uncovered were cases of negligent or intentional trespass.
9 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W. 739 (1914).
30 Id. at 622, 163 S.W. 740 (1914).
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to prove would have been that the truck in fact caused the rock to go
upon the land and strike the child.
Two other street car cases'" with facts very similar to those in the
Sweeney decision followed. The court in dealing with those cases
cited Sweeney, as authority for holding that a showing of negligence
was not necessary for recovery. The same rule was applied in Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Stevens.12 In Happy Coal Co. v. Smith, 3 a spool
of wire under the control of the defendant's employee rolled down a
bill and crashed into a dwelling, injuring one of the occupants. The
court allowed the injured plaintiff to recover saying, "The facts show
an actual trespass for which a recovery may be had with or without
14

negligence."

At the time these cases were being decided there were numerous
personal injury cases, not involving trespass to land, in which the court
very definitely required either negligent or intentional conduct on the
part of the actor before liability was imposed. 15 Thus, we see two lines
of cases involving personal injuries. In one line of cases the injury
was preceeded by a trespass to land, as in the Sweeney case and the
instant case, while in the other there was a personal injury existing
alone. In the former, the courts imposed absolute liability; in the
latter, either negligence or intent had to be shown. Such a situation
presents an unfortunate anomaly.' 6 If the instant case had been decided upon the principle of the Sweeney decision, recovery would have
depended upon whether the child was in her yard at the time when
the rock struck her. Certainly, in this modem day personal safety is
held in greater esteem than any property right; yet it would seem that
"Kentucky Traction and Terminal Co. v. Bain, 174 Ky. 679, 192 S.W. 656,
L.R.A. 1917D, 813 (1917); Kentucky Traction and Terminal Co. v. Grimes, 175

Ky. 694, 194 S.W. 1048 (1917).
12223 Ky. 192, 8 S.W. 2d 203 (1928).

13229 Ky. 716, 17 S.W. 2d 1008 (1929).
14Id. at 717, 17 S.W. 2d 1009 (1929). Speaking of the above cited cases, the
court in Randall v. Shelton at 561, said "We are of the opinion that in the cases
last above cited the same result would have been reached had the doctrine of
Res Ipsa Loquitur been applied which, of course involves the issue of negligence."
In Armstrong v. New Orleans Public Service Inc., 188 So. 189 (La. 1939),
another street car involving trespass to land with resulting personal injury,
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur was applied which raised a rebuttable presumption of negligence.
15 Louisville Railway Co. v. Edelen's Adm'x, 123 Ky. 629, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
1125, 96 S.W. 901 (1906); Lexington Railway Co. v. Vanladen's Adm'r, 32 Ky.
L. Rep. 1047, 107 S.W. 740 (1908); Ham v. Hord, 189 Ky. 317, 224 S.W. 868
(1920).
190judge Clay in Randall v. Shelton at 562, recognized the anomaly when he
said in the opinion, "To point up the absurdity of the situation, suppose the plaintiff had been in her front yard talking to a neighbor and the stone had struck
both. Assuming no negligence, would there be any logic in ruling that the plaintiff
could recover and the neighbor could not?"
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the court in the Sweeney case and the ones following it envisoned the
property right as being more inviolable than the right to personal
safety. This is certainly the inference to be drawn from the two lines
of decisions because, if the plaintiff expected to recover for an unintentional, non-negligent act resulting in injury to himself, he was required to show that the injury was preceeded by a trespass to land in
the usual case. In such a case it would seem that the trespass to the
land was the real wrong. The subsequent personal injury was merely
an aggravation of that wrong.
A rule so obviously fallacious could not persist forever. The first
signs of a break from the rule of the Sweeney case occurred in Jewell
v. Dell.17 In that case a heavily loaded truck left the highway and

struck a building, substantially demolishing it and injuring one of the
occupants. However, the court was not required to face the problem
of whether to again impose strict liability without fault since the injury was attributable to the negligence of the truck driver who operated the truck knowing it had a defective brake. Nevertheless, the
court recognized that the trend of modem authority was that a
defendant is "not subject to liability for an entry that was nonnegligent or was unintentional." In the principal case the court was
required to face squarely the question of whether to continue the
principle of strict liability as laid down in the Sweeney case. The
court, in an excellent opinion, reviewed the state of trespass law in
Kentucky and, recognizing the absurdities in the old rule, expressly
overruled it.

The Randall decision leaves Kentucky law, in regard to trespass, in
a position consistent with majority law. It removed an anchronism
which decided cases, not upon considerations of public policy and
fundamental reason, but upon a strict mechanical formula of direct
causation. It removed an anomaly which was inconsistent with
American concepts of the worth of the individual and brought Kentucky law to the point where it is no longer inferable that Kentucky
courts think more of property rights than they do of personal rights.
That is as it should be.' 8
Charles E. Goss
17284 S.W. 2d 92 (Ky. 1955).
18 The line of cases imposing strict liability which started with Louisville

Railway Co. v. Sweeney, supra note 9, was the subject of a note by Glenn W.
Denham in 85 Ky. Law Journal 164 (1942). The note concluded by saying at 166,
"In regard to liability for unintentional and non-negligent entries on land, Kentucky might well adopt the rational and common sense view which would restrict
the doctrine of absolute liability to those cases where the actor is engaged in an
extra-hazardous activity."

